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Paul J.Davidson*

Uniformity in International Trade
Law: The Constitutional Obstacle

I. Introduction
International trade is the life-blood of the Canadian economy. Exports
have become the largest single source of jobs in Canada, providing
employment for almost three million Canadians and accounting for
approximately 30 per cent of the G.N.P.' It is imperative that everything
possible should be done to encourage the growth of this vital sector of the
economy and that any impediments to such growth should be removed.
One factor which can have an effect on the volume of trade done by
a country is its legal system. Traders are more likely to deal with partners
in countries where they are familiar with the legal system and can be
ensured that their rights will be enforced with the least amount of
difficulty.
[1]t does not seem to be advisable to have in force several conflicting
systems of private international law. Regionalism is out of place in this
area of the law. By remaining injealous isolation, one encourages aimless
and inevitable differentiations of legal rules. This is not conducive to the
development of internationaltrade, a development that is so important to
Canada'seconomic growth.2 [emphasis added]

The desire for familiar rules to govern international trade has led to
numerous and continued efforts over the years to achieve uniformity of
laws governing international trade. The importance of uniformity in
international trade law was underlined by the creation of the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) which
was established pursuant to Resolution 2205(xxi) of the General
Assembly of the United Nations on December 17, 1966.3 The basic
mandate of UNCITRAL is "to further the progressive harmonization and
unification of the law of international trade."'4 To this end, UNCITRAL
has drafted and opened for ratification three international conventions:
* Associate Professor, Department of Law, Carleton University.
1. "Exports: A Matter of Economic Survival," External Affairs Canada, Supplement to the
Globe and Mail, October 1, 1984.
2. Castel, "Canada and the Hague Conference on Private International Law: 1893-1967"
(1967), 55 Can. Bar. Rev. 1.
3. G.A. Res. 2205,21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 88, U.N. Doc. 6316 (1966), reprinted in
1 YB. UNCITRAL at 65, U.N. Doc. A/CN 9 Ser. A/1970 [hereinafter 1 UNCITRAL].
4. G.A. Res. 2102,20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 14) 91, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965), reprinted
in I UNCITRAL at 18.
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the Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of
Goods, 5 the Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, 1978,6 and the
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods.7 In
addition, UNCITRAL has promulgated the UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules 8 and the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules, 9 which are used
extensively to settle disputes in international trade. UNCITRAL also
adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration in June, 1985 and invited the General Assembly to
recommend to States that they should consider the Model Law when
they enact or revise their laws to meet the current needs of international
commercial arbitration. 10 Work has also been done in the area of the law
of negotiable instruments and two draft Conventions have been
circulated: the Draft Convention on International Bills of Exchange and
Promissory Notes 1 and the Draft Convention on International
Cheques. 12 A number of other areas of the law related to international
trade are also being studied by UNCITRAL.
Other international bodies have also been active in proposing
conventions to achieve uniformity in various areas of the law affecting
international trade, such as the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD): Convention on International Multimodal
Transport of Goods; 13 and the International Institute for the Unification
of Private Law (Unidroit): Convention on Agency in the International
Sale of Goods.14 In addition the International Chamber of Commerce has
been very active in developing uniform rules governing many areas of
trade law which, while not binding on parties, have been widely used
voluntarily in international trade: (eg., INCOTERMS, Uniform Customs
and Practice for Documentary Credits, Uniform Rules for Collections,
Uniform Rules for Contract Guarantees).
Although Canada has participated in many of the deliberations leading
to the promulgation of these Conventions and uniform rules there has
been a marked reluctance on the part of the federal government to
commit Canada to any of the Conventions. The main reason for this
5. New York 1974, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 63/15, reprinted in 13 LL.M. 952 (1974).
6. Hamburg 1978, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 89/13, reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 603 (1978).
7. Vienna 1980, U.N. Doec. A/Conf. 97/18, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 668 (1980).
8. Adopted by UNCITRAL at its 9th Session, April 1976, U.N. Doc. A/31/17, 1976,
reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 701.
9. Adopted by the General Assembly in Dec. 1980, U.N. Doec. A/Res 35/52 (1980),
reprinted in 20 1.L.M. 300.
10. U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SR.333 (1985).
11. U.N. Doec. A/CN.9/211 (1981).
12. U.N. Doec. A/CN.9/212 (1981).
13. U.N. Doec. TD/MT/CONF/16 (1980), reprinted in 19 IL.M. 938 (1980).
14. 22 I.L.M. 249 (1983).
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hesitation is the fear that Canada would not be able to guarantee
implementation of her treaty obligations thus entered into because of

constitutional problems. That is, although it is clear that the federal
government may enter into treaties regardless of the subject matter, it has
been argued that the federal Parliament may only enact legislation to
implement treaty obligations that fall squarely within an enumerated
federal head of power and that the subject matter of many of these
conventions may be outside the legislative competence of the federal
Parliament and within the legislative competence of the provincial
legislatures.15
Some attempts have been made to circumvent this problem by the
insertion of a federal state clause. 16 However, aside from the problems
with arriving at an acceptable federal state clause 17, it is submitted that
the federal-state clause is not an entirely satisfactory approach to the
problem as it is still possible to have territorial units within a State which

do not implement the Convention and therefore uniformity across the
country as a whole cannot be achieved. In addition, even if all the units

15. See, eg.: Brierly, "International Trade Arbitration: The Canadian Viewpoint", in Canadian
Perspectives on InternationalLaw and Organization (Toronto: U. of T. Press, 1974), 826 at
835:
The explanation for this inactivity (L.a lack of participation in any multilateral
conventions on arbitration)... lies in the realm of Canadian constitutional law. Thus
while the federal government is the sovereign authority constitutionally empowered to
participate in the creation of a treaty with another state, and the only Canadian
authority able to assume international obligations thereunder, it does not thereupon
acquire the constitutional competence to execute that obligation if its subject matter is
a provincial matter. The subjects of commercial arbitration agreements, procedures and
enforceability of awards are, primarily, matters within a class of subject matter with
respect to which the Canadian Parliament lacks exclusive jurisdiction. And it is not
because a particular subject may have attained a national or even international
commercial importance that these distinctions as to legislative competence will dissolve
away.
16. A federal state clause is a clause in a treaty which recognizes that the federal state may be
unable to guarantee performance of the treaty obligations, as performance may require the
cooperation of the component units. Such a clause may take one of several forms. For
example, it may stipulate that the federal state, in acceding to the treaty, undertakes to perform
only those obligations which are within the federal government's executive or legislative
competence, and agrees to bring the treaty to the attention of the component units of the state
with a favourable recommendation for taking action (see, ag., 1958 N.Y. Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Article XI); or, it may provide for
the contracting federal state to declare to which component units the treaty extends and to
change this declaration from time to time (see, eg., The United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Article 93).
17. In this regard, see the discussion of the problem of the acceptability of the federal state
clause in the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, in
E.P. Mendes and E.S. Binavince, "Canada and the New York Convention on Foreign Arbitral
Awards" (1984), 9 Canadian Arbitration Journal, No.1, 2.
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do implement the Convention, there may be some differences from unit
to unit in the implementing legislation. s

The time has come for more active Canadian participation in
international efforts at achieving uniformity in laws regulating
international trade. This paper is intended to engender discussion towards
such an objective. It will be argued that the federal Parliament, acting by

itself, has jurisdiction not only to enter into conventions dealing with
areas of the law related to international trade matters, but also to
implement them through federal legislation. 19 This jurisdiction, it will be
argued, may be founded on one of two heads of power: i) the federal
treaty power; 20 ii) the power to regulate trade and commerce. 2' In
addition, it will be noted that under the latter head of power the federal
parliament may have an even broader scope to participate in unification
of international trade laws.

II. The Problem
Before looking at the constitutional issue, it is perhaps worthwhile, in
order to illustrate the problem, to look at a few specific instances where

it has been difficult for Canada to participate fully in attempts at
achieving international uniformity in international trade law. Two such
areas are those of dispute settlement by international commercial

arbitration and the rules regarding international sales of goods.
In order for international business to function efficiently it is necessary
to have a system whereby disputes that arise can be settled quickly and
satisfactorily and whereby awards may be enforced against recalcitrant

defendants. Arbitration is the preferred method of settling international
commercial disputes.22 However, problems arise in that different
18. See discussion of legislation implementing N.Y. Convention in Canada, infra.
19. For a discussion regarding implementation of the New York Convention on the
jRecognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, see E.P. Mendes and E.S. Binavince, supra,
note 17 and J.-G. Castel, "Canada and International Arbitration" (1981), 36 The Arbitration
Journal 6. Mendes and Binavince, although questioning the authority of the Labour
Conventionscase, seem to accept that the federal power to implement treaties is limited as held
in that case and argue for a limited implementation of the treaty. Castel also seems to accept
the limited federal power to implement treaties. This paper takes a much broader view of the
federal power to implement treaties.
20. Section 132 of theB.N.A. Act, now the ConstitutionAct 1867.
21. Id, s. 91(2).
22. See eg., Schmitthoff, "Universalism and Regionalism in International Commercial
Arbitration", in International Economic and Trade Law - Universal and Regional
Integration, Schmitthoff and Simmonds, eds. (Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1976) at 179: "It has
become increasingly obvious that disputes arising from or in connection with international
commercial transactions are inherently unsuitable for cognizance by the national courts. The
international business community has recognized this; hence, the growing trend to international
arbitration."
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jurisdictions have different rules governing the conduct of arbitrations
and the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. In order to improve the
efficacy of the international commercial arbitration system it would be
useful if a standard set of procedural rules could be agreed upon and if
uniform rules were applied to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral
awards. The United Nations has been active in both these areas.
The U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards was signed in New York in 1958. The purpose of the
New York Convention is to facilitate the recognition and enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards by providing a simple mechanism for that purpose
in member states. After almost 30 years of debate, Canada has finally
acceded to the New York Convention. Canada's instrument of accession
was deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations on May
12, 1986 and the Convention entered into force in Canada on August 10,
1986. The reason for the delay in acceding to the New York Convention
was the constitutional problem of the federal government's not wanting
to undertake international obligations without being able to ensure that
they were effectively implemented. The position is summarized in the
following letter from the then Minister of Justice dated September 21,
1979:
From time to time over the last number of years, the federal government
has considered carefully the advantages of and the prospects for
ratification of the Convention by Canada. When the matter was last under
active study by this Department, it was considered that full implementation of the Convention would require legislation at the provincial level.
The enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in Canada by Canadian courts
is largely a matter of (sic) falling within the competence of provincial
legislatures. While the "federal state clause" in Article X1 might go some
way to allowing Canadian ratification and implementation without
concurrent legislative action on the part of all of the provinces, provincial
implementing measures would be necessary in order for the Convention to
have any significant effect in Canada.23
During the period that Canada was not a signatory to this Convention,
Canadian business persons were at a disadvantage in negotiating
arbitration clauses in their contracts. This difficulty arose from the fact
that Canadian business persons were unable to guarantee the rapid
recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in Canada. This
may have hindered the ability of Canadian business persons to compete
on an equal footing with foreign competitors as foreign parties preferred
to deal with business partners in countries where they could be
guaranteed that there would be no problem with enforcement of their
contracts (Le. those who are party to the New York Convention).
23. As quoted in, Castel, supra,note 19, at 9 and 10.
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It was only the renewed emphasis on international trade in the 1980s,
coupled with the interest in international commercial arbitration raised
by UNCITRAILs work on the Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration, that finally resulted in the federal government and the
provinces and territories being able to get together and to agree to cooperate in order to allow Canada to accede to the New York Convention.
Although this federal-provincial cooperation is to be lauded its necessity
illustrates how easily matters can be delayed and how Canada can be left
out of important international conventions.
In addition to the difficulty in getting unanimous agreement to allow
Canada to even accede to such a convention, there remains the difficulty
that a foreign party is still faced with 13 separate jurisdictions when it
comes to enforcing an award in Canada and the implementing legislation
can vary slightly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For example, in the
legislation implementing the New York Convention, the province of
Saskatchewan has put in a reciprocity reservation limiting applicability of
the Convention to parties from other contracting states while other
jurisdictions have not.24 In addition, while all jurisdictions have limited
the applicability of the Convention as provided for in Article 1 Paragraph
3 of the Convention to "differences arising out of legal relationships...
which are considered as commercial. . .",there may be some differences
in the interpretation of this provision across Canada arising from the
actual wording of the legislation. These differences will arise because
what is considered by the courts in one jurisdiction to be commercial
may be different from what is considered commercial by the courts of
another jurisdiction.25 This may be the case particularly between the
courts of the common law jurisdictions and the civil law jurisdiction of

Quebec.
The second aspect of achieving uniformity in international arbitration
law, Le., the uniform procedural rules, was considered by the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law and in June, 1985
UNCITRAL adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration and invited the General Assembly to
24. The-Enforcement ofForeignArbitralAwardsAct,S.Sask. 1986, s. 5.
25. In this regard it should be noted that the implementing legislation of some of the
jurisdictions specifically refers this matter to be determined by the law of that jurisdiction. For
example: Foreign Arbitral Awards Act, S.B.C. 1986, s. 3, "... considered as commercial
under the law of British Columbia"; Foreign ArbitralAwards Act, S.O. 1986, s. 1 (1), "...
recognized as commercial by the law of Ontario" (note: The ForeignArbitralAwardsAct is
being repealed by the InternationalCommercial ArbitrationAct, Bill 17 (Ont.), 1987 which
was given First Reading on May 4, 1987, as this Act will serve itself to implement the N.Y.
Convention. This new Act refers simply to "international commercial arbitration agreements
and awards", s. 2(2)); Foreign Arbitral Awards Act, S.Y. 1986, c.4, s. 3, "considered as
commercial under the law of the Yukon".

Uniformity in International Trade Law

recommend to States that they should consider the Model Law when
they enact or revise their laws to meet the current needs of international
commercial arbitration.26 The Model Law constitutes a modem practical
code of arbitration procedure and it is hoped that its wide acceptance
among member states of the U.N. will lead to its voluntary adoption in
legislation in those states and others when they reconsider their laws
which deal with international commercial arbitration.
Although it is not in the form of a Convention and therefore does not
raise the constitutional issue of treaty implementation, it does illustrate
the broader constitutional problem faced by Canada in achieving
uniformity in international trade law. If international trade is considered
to be within the competence of the provincial jurisdictions then in order
to obtain uniformity in this regard across Canada it will be necessary for
13 jurisdictions to enact identical legislation based on the Model Law. If
it is within the competence of the federal Parliament then only one piece
of legislation would be necessary.
Canada, in fact, is the first country to enact legislation which is based
on the Model Law. The federal government introduced Bill C-108, The
CommercialArbitrationAct, on May 1, 1986, which is modelled after
the Model Law and in fact incorporates it, with very minor modifications
as a schedule, "The Commercial Arbitration Code". However, this
statute is limited in that:
The Code applies only in relation to matters where at least one of the

parties to the arbitration is a department or a Crown corporation or in
relation to maritime or admiralty matters. 27
The provinces have also introduced or are considering introducing
legislation based on the Model Law.28 However, not all provinces have
introduced such legislation and the legislation which has been introduced
varies slightly from one jurisdiction to another.
The main problem remains that a foreign business person dealing with
a Canadian partner from one province can never be certain that the law
that will apply will be the same as that which applies when dealing with
a Canadian partner from another province.
26. U.N. Doe. A/CN.9/SR.333 (1985).
27. CommercialArbitrationAct, S.C. 1986, c. 21, s. 5(2).
28. 1. Alberta: International Commercial Arbitration Act, S.A. 1986, c. 1-6.6.
2. British Columbia: International Commercial Arbitration Act, S.B.C. 1986, c. 14.
3. Manitoba: The International Commercial Arbitration Act, S.M. 1986, c. 32.
4. New Brunswick: International Commercial Arbitration Act, S.N.B. 1986, c. 1-12.2.
5. Newfoundland. The International Commercial Arbitration Act, S.N. 1986, c. 45.
6. Nova Scotia: International Commercial Arbitration Act, S.N.S. 1986, c. 12.
7. Ontario: InternationalCommercialArbitrationAct, Bill 17, 1987 (Ont.). First reading,
May 4, 1987.
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A second area in which attempts have been made to achieve
international uniformity is the law governing the international sale ofgoods. It would seem only logical to have a transaction which is by
definition international, governed by a uniform international law rather
than by the domestic law of one of the parties or perhaps of some third
country. To this end the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law has drafted the Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods (CISG) which was adopted in Vienna on April 10, 1980.29
This convention was the culmination of many years' work originating in
the early '30s with the International Institute for the Unification of
Private Law. 0
Canada participated as an observer at the UNCITRAL deliberations
and a federal state clause 3' was inserted in the convention at Canada's
request because of the federal government's concern that it might not be
able to guarantee implementation of the convention since the subject
matter of the convention was thought to fall within provincial jurisdiction
over property and civil rights. However, despite the existence of the
federal state clause, the federal government did not become a signatory to
the convention, nor has it acceded to it.
The convention and the problems of Canada's adopting it have been
discussed elsewhere 32. However, a couple of points bear mention here to
indicate some of the problems raised because of Canada's constitutional
structure.
First, it is a difficult task to achieve the necessary agreement of all the
provinces and territories to co-ordinate their domestic laws to allow for
uniform implementation of the convention. The federal government is
reluctant to accede to the treaty and allow for piece-meal implementation, although this was the purpose of including the federal state clause in
the convention.
8. Prince Edward Island: International Commercial Arbitration Act, S.P.E.I. 1986, c. 14.
9. Quebec: An Act to Amend the Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure in Respect
ofArbitration,S.Q. 1986, c. 73.
10. Saskatchewan: Implementation of the UNCITRAL Model Law is being considered
(Letter to author from Lorelle E. Schoenfeld, Crown Solicitor, Saskatchewan Justice,
June 24, 1986.)
11. Yukon: International Commercial Arbitration Act, S.Y., 1987, c. 14.
12. Northwest Territories: InternationalCommercialArbitrationAct O.N.W.T. 1986.
29. U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 97/18 (1980) (supra,note 7).
30. For a further discussion of the history of this convention, see Ziegel, "Should Canada
Adopt the International Sales Convention?", in Faculty of Law, McGill University, Meredith
MemorialLectures - New Developments in Law ofExport Sales, (Toronto: DeBoo, 1983), 67
at 68 to 69.
31. Article 93. See also comments in note 16, supra.
32. See, eg., Ziegel, supra, note 30.
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Further, difficulties could arise if the provinces request different
declarations under Article 94 of the Convention. Article 94(1) provides
that:
Two or more contracting States which have the same or closely related
legal rules on matters governed by this Convention may at any time
declare that the Convention is not to apply to contracts of sale or their
formation where the parties have their places of business in those States.
Article 94(2) is of similar effect in allowing a contracting party to make
a unilateral declaration of non-applicability with respect to contracts
involving a party whose place of business is in a non-contracting state. As
the article only permits contractingStates to make such declarations, it
would appear that such a declaration would have to apply equally to all
territorial units within a contracting state and that separate declarations
could not be made for each territorial unit. This might be a significant
problem in Canada where there are two separate legal systems that must
be taken into account. For example, although France's legal rules on sales
may be the same or closely related to those of Quebec, they may differ
substantially from the rules in the common law provinces.
In. The ConstitutionalIssue
From the above discussion, it can be seen why Professor Ziegel was led
to comment:
What does seem clear to me is that Canada will not be able to play a full
role in international3 law making until our self-imposed constitutional
fetters are removed
The following discussion will argue that these fetters can indeed be
removed and that the federal government does have the constitutional
competence to implement treaty obligations without the necessity of
provincial legislation and that in the area of international trade law the
constitutional power goes beyond mere treaty implementation to
encompass legislation on all aspects affecting international trade and
commerce. The latter power would enable Canada to achieve uniformity
in international trade law not only through treaty obligations but also
through the more informal route of implementing uniform legislation
based on model laws agreed to by UNCITRAL or other international
bodies.
1. The FederalTreatyPower
The only reference to treaties in the ConstitutionAct 1867 is section 132
which provides that:
33. Id, at 85.
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The Parliament and Government of Canada shall have all powers
necessary or proper for performing the obligations of Canada or of any
Province thereof, as part of the British Empire, towards foreign countries,
arising under treaties between the Empire and such foreign countries.
[emphasis added]
The fact that this is the only reference to treaty power and that nowhere
else is reference made to foreign or external affairs is not surprising if one
looks at the historical context. Prior to 1867 the colonies had no control
over external affairs, this being a task for the Imperial government. At the
time of federation in 1867 it was considered that this treaty-making
power would continue to reside with the British government and that all
that was necessary was to provide the federal Parliament of Canada with
the power to implement such Empire treaties. It was simply not
contemplated that Canada would eventually possess international status
and would enter into treaties in her own right. However, Canada
gradually shed her colonial fetters and achieved independent international status with concurrent powers to negotiate and conclude
treaties. 34 The problem which arose with this treaty-making power was
the question of the ability to implement treaties thus entered into. As the
question of implementation of other than Empire treaties was not
specifically provided for in the B.N.A. Act of 1867, and as Canada's new
status was not achieved through an amendment to the B.N.A. Act but
through developing customs and conventions, it became a question of
judicial interpretation as to the power to implement such treaty
obligations. The development of this treaty implementation power has its
roots in three decisions of the Privy Council.
In the Aeronautics case' 5 the Privy Council considered the validity of
federal legislation regulating aerial navigation. As this legislation had
been enacted to implement provisions of the 1919 Aerial Navigation
Convention which had been ratified by His Majesty the King on behalf
of the British Empire, the Privy Council had little hesitation in upholding
the legislation as a valid exercise of the power to implement Empire
treaties provided for in section 132. It had been argued for the provinces
that section 132 only gave such power as was necessary to fulfil the
obligations referred to and that if provincial legislation passed pursuant to
a head of s. 92 of the B.N.A. Act adequately covered the matter, there
34. This development of international status was recognized in the 1926 and 1930 Imperial
Conferences and in the Statute of Westminster, 1931, which provided that the dominions
"... are autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way
subordinate to one another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs." For a more
detailed discussion of the treaty power and the achievement of Dominion status, see Gotlieb,
"The Method of Canadian Treaty Making" (1967), 1 Can. Leg. Studies 181.
35. Re Regulationand ControlofAeronauticsin Canada,[1932] A.C. 54.
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was no need for federal legislation. However, Lord Sankey's judgement
indicated that the Privy Council was of the opinion that s. 132 went
further and gave the federal Parliament exclusive powers of implementation:
It will be observed, however, from the very definite words of the section,
that it is the Parliament and Government of Canada who are to have all
powers necessary or proper for performing the obligations of Canada, or
any Province thereof. It would therefore appear to follow that any
Convention of the character under discussion necessitates Dominion
legislation in order that it may be carried out.3 6
His judgement also contains language which appears to indicate that the
Privy Council was prepared to go even further and to give the federal
parliament wide powers of implementation of treaty obligations outside
s. 132:
Further, their Lordships are influenced by the facts that the subject of
aerial navigation and the fulfilment of Canadian obligations under s. 132
are matters of national interest and importance; and that aerial navigation
is a class of subject which has7 attained such dimensions as to affect the
body politic of the Dominion?
This statement could be construed as an indication that the matter could
be brought under the federal power "to make laws for the Peace, Order
'38
and Good Government of Canada.
The second case in the trilogy is the Radio case.39 This time the
challenged federal legislation had been enacted to implement the
International Radiotelegraph Convention of 1927, which had been
ratified by Canada after Canada had been involved in its negotiation. The
Privy Council held that the Convention did not fall under section 132 but
that the Parliament of Canada nevertheless had power to implement its
treaty obligations under its general or residuary power to make laws for
the peace, order and good government of Canada, similar to those which
it would have had under section 132. Viscount Dunedin commented as
follows:
This idea of Canada as a Dominion being bound by a convention
equivalent to a treaty with foreign powers was quite unthought of in 1867.
It is the outcome of the gradual development of the position of Canada
vis-&-vis to the mother country Great Britain, which is found in these later
days expressed in the Statute of Westminster. It is not, therefore, to be
expected that such a matter should be dealt with in explicit words in either
36. Id,at 74.
37. Id, at 66.
38. ConstitutionAc4 1867,s. 91.
39. Re Regulationand ControlofRadio Communication in Canada,[1932] A.C. 304.
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s. 91 or s. 92. The only class of treaty which would bind Canada was
thought of as a treaty by Great Britain, and that was provided by s. 132.
Being, therefore, not mentioned explicitly in either s. 91 or s. 92, such
legislation falls within the general words at the opening of s. 91... In fine,
though agreeing that the Convention was not such a treaty as defined in
s. 132, their Lordships think that it comes to the same thing. 4
This expansive interpretation of the treaty power was brought to an
end by the third case in the series: the Labour Conventions case 4' and it
is from this case that the current problem of treaty implementation stems.
The federal legislation in question in that case had been passed to
implement treaty obligations undertaken by Canada pursuant to its
ratification of conventions adopted by the International Labour Organ-

ization. Again, it was held that as this was not an Empire treaty, section
132 could not be called on to give jurisdiction. But, more importantly, the
Privy Council declined to accept the view adopted by the Supreme Court
of Canada that the Aeronautics case and the Radio case constrained them
to hold that jurisdiction to legislate with regard to implementing treaty
obligations resided exclusively in the Parliament of Canada. As Lord
Atkin said:
Their Lordships cannot take this view of those decisions. The Aeronautics
case concerned legislation to perform obligations imposed by a treaty
between the Empire and foreign countries. Section 132, therefore, clearly
applied, and but for a remark at the end of the judgement, which in view
of the stated ground of decision was clearly obiter, the case could not be
said to be an authority on the matter now under discussion. The
judgement in the Radio case appears to present more difficulty. But when
that case is examined it will be found that the true ground of the decision
was that the convention in that case dealt with classes of matters which did
not fall within the enumerated classes of subjects in s. 92, or even within
the enumerated classes in s. 91. Part of the subject matter of the
convention, namely, broadcasting, might come under an enumerated class,
but if so it was under a heading "Interprovincial Telegraphs", expressly
excluded from s. 92. Their Lordships are satisfied that neither case affords
a warrant for holding that legislation to perform a Canadian treaty is
exclusively within the Dominion legislative power. 42
40. Id,at 312.
41. A.G.for Can. v.A.G.for Ont, [1937] A.C. 326.
42. Id, at 351. Cf.Lederman, "Legislative Power to Implement Treaty Obligations in
Canada" in Aitchison (ed.), The PoliticalProcess in Canada(Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1963) at 171: "It is true that Lord Atkin (in the Labour Conventions case) purported to
distinguish the Radio case. He dismissed the remarks of Viscount Dunedin on the treatyperforming power as obiter dicta and said that the one true reason of that decision was the
finding that regulation of radio communication was within the federal legislative powers
anyway even if there were no treaty. But this is simply not a legitimate interpretation of
Viscount Dunedin's reasons for judgement. If one reads what Viscount Dunedin said,
obviously he was resting his decision on both grounds. ... So the Radio case cannot be
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Lord Atkin went on to say:
It must not be thought that the result of this decision is that Canada is
incompetent to legislate in performance of treaty obligations. In totality of
legislative powers, Dominion and Provincial together, she is fully
equipped. But the legislative powers remain distributed, and if in the
exercise of her new functions derived from the new international status
Canada incurs obligations they must, so far as legislation is concerned,
when they deal with Provincial classes of subjects, be dealt with by cooperation between the Dominion and the Provinces. While the ship of
state now sails on larger ventures and into foreign waters, she still retains
the watertight compartments which are an essential part of her original
structure.43
Canada was thus left in the unenviable position of not being able to
guarantee implementation of international obligations entered into if
there was some question that the subject matter might come within
provincial jurisdiction and thus require provincial legislation to
implement. The effect of this was to impede Canada's ability to partake
in many important international agreements. As ER.Scott has put it, "So
long as Canada clung to the Imperial apron strings, her Parliament was
all powerful in legislating on Empire treaties, and no doctrine of
'watertight compartments' existed; once she became a nation in her own
right, impotence descended." 44
The reasoning of Lord Atkin in the Labour Conventions case has
received much adverse criticism. Lord Wright, a member of the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council at the time the case was decided, has
implied that the Judicial Committee was far from unanimous in its
decision and that the issue "was really settled.., by the Privy Council
in the Aeronautics and Radio cases,' 4 and Mr. Chief Justice Kerwin of
the Supreme Court of Canada, indicated in 1956 that "it may be
necessary ... to consider in the future the judgement of the Judicial
Committee in The Labour Conventions case."46 However for years it was
thought that the Privy Council decision in the Labour Conventions case
had laid to rest any claim that the federal government might have to a
general power to implement treaty obligations without regard to the
division of legislative powers between the federal Parliament and the
dismissed as Lord Atkin purports to dismiss it. The Radio case speaks for itself as a precedent
to the Supreme Court of Canada in the words of Viscount Dunedin." I would agree with
Professor Lederman.
43. Id, at 353-354.
44. Scott, ER., "Labour Conventions Case: Lord Wrights Undisclosed Dissent?" (1956), 34.
Can. Bar. Rev. 114 at 115.
45. Lord Wright of Durley et al., "Rt. Hon. Sir Lyman Poore Duff, G.C.M.G., 1865-1955"
(1955), 33 Can. Bar. Rev. 1113, at 1126.
46. Francisv.The Queen, [1956] S.C.R. 618 at 621.
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provincial legislatures. Recent judicial statements have indicated that this
is not necessarily so.
In 1968 the Supreme Court of Canada gave its opinion in the Offshore
Minerals Reference47, which contains statements 4 that could be
construed as overruling the Labour Conventions case. Unfortunately, the
Court did not give reasons for these statements and one commentator has
been led to say "[It is submitted, with respect, that the Supreme Court
has erred . .,,49 and "the Court could surely not have intended this
result, '50 and another to state:
Since it strains credulity to believe that the Supreme Court of Canada
intended ... to overrule the Labour Conventions decision sub silentio,
one's conclusion may have to be that the LabourConventions case was not
properly presented by counsel... and that this apparent non sequitur in
the Offshore Mineral
Rights Reference was therefore arrived at by the
51
Court per incuriam.
Thus, the position of the Labour Conventions case in Canada was still left
in doubt. More recently, though, the Supreme Court of Canada has
indicated a willingness to reconsider the Labour Conventionscase; first in
1976 in MacDonald v. Vapour Canada Ltd,52, and more recently in
53
Schneiderv. The Queen.
In the Vapour case,54 Laskin, C.J., in obiterdicta, referred to some of
the criticism of the Labour Convention case and said that "the foregoing
references would support a reconsideration of the Labour Conventions
case" 55 and mentioned the possibility of Parliament's passing legislation
"in implementation of an international obligation by Canada under a

47. [1967] S.C.R. 792.
48. "Legislative jurisdiction... must, therefore belong exclusively to Canada (b&:ause, inter
alia)... the rights in the territorial sea arise by international law and depend upon recognition
by other sovereign States. Legislative jurisdiction in relation to the lands in question belongs to
Canada which is a sovereign State recognized by international law and thus able to enter into
arrangements with other States respecting the rights in the territorial sea." (Id, at 817).
"British Columbia lacks... legislative jurisdiction (interalia,because) Canada is the sovereign
State which will be recognized by international law as having the rights stated in the
Convention of 1958, and it is Canada, not the Province of British Columbia, that will have to
answer the claims of other members of the international community for breach of the
obligations and responsibilities imposed by the Convention." (Id, at 821).
49. Head, Ivan L., "The Canadian Offshore Minerals Reference: The Application of
International Law to a Federal Constitution" (1968), U. ofT Law Joum. 131 at 155.
50. Id., at 156.
51. E. McWhinney, "Canadian Federalism, and the Foreign Affairs and Treaty Power. The
Impact of Quebec's 'Quiet Revolution' (1969), 7 Can. Y.B.I.L. 19 at 20.
52. [1977] 2 S.C.R. 134.
53. (1983), 139 D.L.R. (3d) 417.
54. For a comment on this case, see P.W. Hogg (1976), 54 Can. Bar. Rev. 361.
55. [1977] 2 S.C.R. 134 at 169.
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treaty or convention" which would otherwise be beyond its
56
competence.
In Schneider,Mr. Justice Dickson, as he then was, 57 wrote the opinion
for the majority of the court. It had been argued that "Parliament has
jurisdiction to enact laws in relation to obligations assumed by Canada as
a signatory to international treaties or conventions" 5s and further that
"even if the exercise of federal implementation of treaty obligations
touches upon a provincial subject matter, it is competent to Parliament so
to do in relation to a treaty as a matter of national concern. ' 59 In
commenting on this argument Dickson, J. said:
Although the point was left open in this court in MacDonald et aL v.
Vapour CanadaLtd... the appellant's proposition is questionable in the
face of Lord Atkin'sjudgement [in the Labour Conventions case]. 60
However, he went on to say:
That aside, this court in the MacDonald v. Vapour case held that even
assuming Parliament has power to pass legislation implementing a treaty
or convention in relation to matters covered by the treaty or convention
which would otherwise be for provincial legislation alone the exercise of
that power must be manifested in the implementing legislation and not left
to inference.
There is nothing in the Narcotic ControlAct to indicate that the Act or
any part of it was enacted in implementation of Canada's treaty
obligations...

61

This statement would seem to indicate that if it were clearly set out in the
legislation that it was enacted pursuant to a treaty obligation, the Court
might be prepared to consider whether it would uphold the federal
legislation though it dealt with subject matter otherwise within provincial
competence. Although these comments on the treaty implementation
power are clearly obiter, they were not dissented from by any other
member of the Court and can be taken as an indication of a willingness
on the part of the Court to consider argument for a broad power of treaty
implementation by the federal government. 62 Nowhere is this need for a
56. Id.
57. Now Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
58. (1983) 139 D.L.R. (3d) 417 at 437.

59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id, at 437-438.
62. For a comment on the Schneider case arguing for a narrower interpretation, see A.L.C.
De Mestral (1983), 61 Can. Bar. Rev. 856 where he concludes (at 865):
With the obiter dicta in Vapour Canada and Schneider concerning the treatyimplementing power, the Supreme Court of Canada has taken itself very far out on a
limb. If the Court is not careful the branch will soon break and the Court and the
country will be the worse for it. There isstill time to climb down.
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broad treaty implementation power more evident than in the area of

those international agreements which can affect Canada's economic wellbeing and commercial livelihood.
Even though it may be impossible to bring broad treaty implementation power within section 132 of the ConstitutionAct, 1867 "unless its
words are tortured to meet the present international position, and this is
too much to expect of the courts, '63 an argument can clearly be made to
bring such power within the residual power of the Parliament of Canada
to make laws for the peace, order and good government of Canada. As
the Honourable Ivan C. Rand, formerly of the Supreme Court of
Canada, said in the Oliver Wendell Holmes Lecture delivered at the
Harvard Law School on February 26, 1960:64
That legislative power [to implement treaties] likewise has been
transmitted or has arisen as an inherent faculty of an independent state.
The legislative competence of the provinces is limited to specific subjects
enumerated in section 92 of the Act of 1867 together with a general class
embracing local and private matters. As treaties do not fall within this
general clause, we can say that as a distinct legislative subject matter they
find no place in any provincial category. But the relation of treaty to
province arises from another question which is this: Is legislation which
implements a treaty legislation "in relation to" the treaty or in relation to
the specific matters with which the treaty deals? By the retention of treatymaking and implementation in the British Government and Parliament
and its delegation of performance to the Dominion by section 132, the
totality of treaty-making action was treated as being a discrete and entire
subject matter. Can legislation of such a nature, then, be other than "in
relation to" treaty-matter, that is, matter in a treaty aspect? I cannot agree
that it is possible to eliminate treaty character from legislation
accomplishing its terms.... Assuming treaty-making to be an entirety as
legislative matter, the transmission or originated faculty finds its only place
of reception in the residual power of the Dominion...65
63. Laskin, CanadianConstitutionalLaw,(4th ed. 1975) at 218. For an argument that it could
be brought within the wording of s. 132, see R.J. Matas, "Treaty Making in Canada" (1947),
25 Can. Bar. Rev. 458 where the author states at 470-471: "On a broad constitutional
interpretation section 132 should therefore be considered as applicable to a treaty made today
as it was to a treaty made in 1867."
64. Ivan C. Rand, "Some Aspects of Canadian Constitutionalism" (1960), 38 Can. Bar. Rev.
135 at 142-143.
65. This approach, which treats the power to implement treaties as a separate head of power
coming within the general residual power, can be compared with the approach taken by
Professor Lederman in his article "Legislative Power to Implement Treaty Obligations in
Canada," supra,note 42. Professor Lederman suggests that this approach goes too far and that
rather than having a separate head of power to implement treaties, the existence of a treaty
should simply be a factor to consider in determining whether the "international obligations of
Canada could be of such character as to confer on the matters with which they were concerned
national dimensions and national importance within Canada sufficient to invoke the federal
general power." He continues, "It is possible to maintain that some international obligations
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While such a broad power to legislate to implement treaty obligations
would appear to threaten provincial autonomy, there is no reason to
believe that the federal government would use such a power as an
untrammelled vehicle to enter into colourable treaties simply to extend its
legislative power. Canada is, as are other nations, very jealous of the

scope of its sovereign powers. As assumption of international obligations
puts limits on these powers, Canada is unlikely to enter into international
obligations merely to acquire competence over what would otherwise be
provincial matters. As long as the exercise of the federal treaty power is

bonafide and is not a mere colourable attempt to intrude on provincial
powers, the fact that the subject matter might otherwise be within a
provincial sphere of competence should not derogate from the
paramount power of the federal Parliament to pass legislation to
implement treaty obligations as part of the residual power to legislate for

the peace, order and good government of Canada.
In the majority of federal states the power to enter into and implement

treaties is the sole responsibility of the federal authorities. 66 The situation
in Canada can be compared to the situation in Australia where it has
been held that the Commonwealth Parliament has legislative power to
implement any international convention even though it might impinge on
the legislative sphere of the states, the only qualification being that the
treaty must have been entered into in good faith and not merely as a
67
device to attract the Commonwealth legislative power.
While the ship of state may still retain her "watertight compartments

which are an essential part of her original structure," 68 it must be
remembered that there can only be one helmsman at the wheel to chart
the course and steer the ship of state as it "sails on larger ventures and into

foreign waters" lest she flounder on the rocks by being driven in all
directions at once. This helmsman must have the power to make and
would have this effect without insisting with the Radio case that all international obligations
must have this effect" (at 178). However I think that this approach, while a step in the right
direction, does not go far enough in ensuring the capability to implement treaty obligations,
which is necessary if Canada is to play a role in the development of international law. In taking
the approach which he does Professor Lederman seems to be concerned that there be some
limit on the federal power as the broader approach "could and quite possibly would eliminate
the essential autonomy of the provinces and thus end the federal constitution" (at 178). While
I agree that some control is necessary to ensure that the federal Parliament does not usurp the
totality of the provincial powers under the guise of treaty implementation, I believe this can be
accomplished within the broader approach.
66. See:.Morris, "The Treaty-Making Power. A Canadian Dilemma" (1967), 55 Can. Bar.
Rev. 478 at 492-497.
67. The Commonwealth ofAustralia v. The State of Tasmania (1983), 57 A.LJ.R., 450. (The
FranklinRiverDam Case).
68. A.G. Can. v.A.G. Ont, [1937] A.C. 327 at 354,per Lord Atkin.
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implement decisions for the better good of the entire ship; in the case of
Canada this helmsman is the federal Parliament.
2. The Regulation of Tradeand Commerce
Even if one were to disagree with a broad federal power to legislate to
implement treaty obligations as suggested above, it is this author's
opinion that the authority to legislate relating to international trade
matters comes under the trade and commerce power of section 91(2) of
the ConstitutionAct, 1867, in which case even the narrower test of the
Labour Conventions case would be satisfied. 69 This approach would have
the added advantage of affording an even broader scope to legislate for
uniformity in matters affecting international trade where attempts at
uniformity are made through other than international treaties (eg., by
way of model laws) 70 in that it would not necessitate formal treaty
obligation before uniform legislation could be passed.
A broad discussion of the trade and commerce power is beyond the
scope of this paper and, in any event, has been undertaken in detail
elsewhere. 71 However, a few comments on the federal power in the area
of international trade law are in order.
Although the trade and commerce power has in general received a
restricted interpretation for fear that "unless the scope to which its literal
meaning was susceptible was restricted it would materially curtail, if not
extinguish, provincial powers in local matters intended to be
conferred," 72 it has always been interpreted as encompassing the power to
legislate with respect to the regulation of interprovincial and international
trade. Kerwin, C.J. in Re The Farm Products Marketing Act 73 in
discussing the ambit of the trade and commerce power stated:
Once a statute aims at "regulation of trade in matters of interprovincial
concern" (Citizen Ins. Co. v. Parsons(1881), 7 App. Cas. 96 at 113), it is
beyond the competence of a Provincial Legislature.
Once an article enters into the flow of interprovincial or external trade, the
subject matter and all its attendant circumstances cease to be a mere
matter of local concern. 74
69. That is, the federal Parliament in enacting legislation to implement international trade
obligations would be acting within a federal class of subjects.
70, For example, the Draft Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/246 (1984).
71. See, eg., Smith, The Commerce Power in Canada and the United States (Toronto:
Butterworths, 1963).
72. Ivan C. Rand, supra,note 64 at 157.
73. [1957] S.C.R. 198.
74. Id, at 204-205. These statements have been quoted as stating the law in a number of
subsequent cases dealing with the trade and commerce power. CarnationCo. Ltd v. Quebec
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However, although the federal jurisdiction to legislate in relation to the
regulation of international trade and commerce is clear, the extent of
what amounts to the "regulation of international trade and commerce" is
not so clear. In commenting on the competition between "Trade and
Commerce" (section 91(2)) and "Property and Civil Rights" (section
92(13)) Professor Lederman stated as follows:
The general line of distinction between section 91(2) and section 92(13)
was drawn as follows: Given that the challenged law is both property or
contract law and trading or commercial law, if the trade or commerce is
internal to a single province, then the property and civil rights aspect is the
more important and provincial power is exclusive. But, if the challenged
law is property or contract law about interprovincial or international trade
or commerce, then its trading or commercial aspect is the more important
and the federal power is exclusive. 75
It is submitted that if a transaction in its inception envisages goods or
services entering the flow of trade outside the province then all elements
of that transaction including the regulation of the contracts governing that
transaction, are matters for federal regulation. This would, inter alia,
include the regulation of the international contract of sale, as the contract
is not dealing solely with rights within the province but by its very nature
deals with rights extending beyond provincial boundaries, 76 and laws
providing for the arbitration of international trade and investment
disputes, which also transcend provincial boundaries.
That the federal Parliament is to have the power to legislate with
respect to international trade and commerce, even if in so doing it were
to affect property and civil rights within the province, is clear if one looks
at the Constitution Act in a historical context. It is clear that what was
77
desired at the time of confederation was a strong central government.
The single most important factor in the United Kingdom's strength at the
time (mid-19th century) was its position as a trading nation and among
its most important laws were those dealing with matters regulating
international trade and commerce. Thus, bearing in mind the importance
of international trade and commerce to the development of England's
economy and England's position as a trading nation in the 19th century,
AgriculturalMarketing Boardet al,[1968] S.C.R. 238; A.G. Man. v. Man. Egg andPoultry
Assn., [1971] S.C.R. 689; Can. Indust. Gas & OilLtd v. Sask, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 545.
75. WR. Lederman, "The Concurrent Operation of Federal and Provincial Laws in Canada
(1963), 9 McGill L.3. 185 at 187-188.
76. It is these types of sales contracts which are envisaged by the U.N. Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 97/18 (1980), Article 1:
"This Convention applies to contracts of sale of goods between parties whose places of business
are in different States...."
77. See ag., Smith, The Commerce Power in Canadaand the United States (Butterworths,
Toronto, 1963) chap. 1.
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it would be impossible to argue otherwise than that the term "trade and
commerce" in a 19th century British statute encompassed international
trade and commerce. If one is to look at the other topics specifically
mentioned in section 91, the object of giving the federal Parliament
exclusive control over matters affecting general trade and commerce
becomes even clearer as the federal Parliament is given the power to
legislate in regard to all other matters affecting trade and commerce:
section 91(1) Navigation and Shipping; section 91(14) Currency and
Coinage; section 91(15) Banking; section 91(17) Weights and Measures;
section 91(18) Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes; section 91(19)
78
Interest; section 91(20) Legal Tender.
Although federal legislation regulating international trade and
commerce could lead to a dual system of laws in a number of areas, it is
submitted that this should not lead to any insurmountable problems.
Federal laws would govern where the trade is international or
interprovincial while provincial laws would regulate intraprovincial
trade. Such a dual system of laws is not without precedent even in a
unitary state. For example, the United Kingdom has enacted the Uniform
Laws on International Sales Act 1967 which applies only to contracts for
the international sale of goods and not to domestic transactions. 79 In
addition, the United Kingdom has recently adopted an arbitration act
which distinguishes between domestic and non-domestic arbitrations and
provides different rules to govern each. France also has a recent
arbitration law which provides different treatment for international as
opposed to purely domestic arbitration.80
IV. Conclusion
If Canada is to maintain her position as a world trader it is imperative
that she keep abreast of and in tune with the progress which is being
78. It is not being argued here that the federal Parliament has an all-encompassing power to
legislate with regards to every facet of trade and commerce which a literal meaning of those
words might indicate. Sir Montague Smith in Citizens Insurance Company of Canada v.
Parsons(1881),7 App. Cas. 96 at 112 indicated this was not so:
.. a consideration of the Act shews that the words were not used in this unlimited
sense. In the first place the collacation of No. 2 with classes of subjects of national and
general concern affords an indication that regulations relating to general trade and
commerce were in the mind of the legislature.... If the words had been intended to
have the full scope of which in their literal meaning they are susceptible, the specific
mention of several of the other classes of subjects enumerated in s. 91 would have been
unnecessary....
However, the mention of these other classes does, as argued, reinforce the claim that "trade and
commerce" includes "general trade and commerce", including especially international trade.
79. See: Schmithoff, The Export Trade, 7th ed. (London: Stevens & Sons, 1980), chap. 13.
80. Decree No. 81-500 dated May 12, 1981.
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made towards uniformity in laws regulating international trade and
participate actively in their formation. To achieve uniformity across
Canada, any legislation in this regard must be at the federal level. This
paper has argued that the federal Parliament does indeed have the
legislative authority to ensure that such legislation is implemented either
as part of a treaty obligation or pursuant to more informal steps at
uniformity, such as model laws. It is hoped that in the future Canada will
take an even more active role in the development of such uniform laws,
confident that their implementation across Canada as a whole will be
upheld.

